In late 2010, as the Director of the U.S. Army's Rapid Equipping Force (REF), I witnessed firsthand the critical importance of rapid adaptation in warfare.
The gap between the speed at which we recognized and responded to emerging changes on the battlefield compared with that of the Taliban was dramatic, leading to a devastating 5000 casualties for our Soldiers. This stark number underscores the human cost of our slow adaptation.
Our experiences in Afghanistan during this period offer valuable lessons for today – in Ukraine and elsewhere – about the consequences of slow recognition and response to evolving battlefield conditions.
The Shift in Battlefield Dynamics
When President Bush acknowledged that we were losing ground in Afghanistan, there was a major shift in equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan. A key part of this transfer was the deployment of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which had proven effective against IEDs on Iraq's highways.
The expectation was that MRAPs would be equally effective in Afghanistan. However, this assumption failed to account for the stark differences between the two theaters. While Iraq had a relatively developed infrastructure with highways and roads, Afghanistan was vastly different - a land with little infrastructure outside major cities.
The situation changed dramatically when President Bush decided to send a surge of soldiers into Afghanistan. Unlike previous deployments, these were primarily light infantry units, equipped and trained for a fight that would change dramatically from road bound clearance missions to fights in alleyways and donkey paths.
The Unforeseen Challenge
As these dismounted infantry units began operations, particularly in areas like Kandahar and the Helmand Valley, we saw a significant shift in Taliban tactics. The enemy recognized an opportunity to inflict casualties on American forces more easily by targeting dismounted troops rather than heavily armored vehicles.
This shift is clearly illustrated in the data on IED attacks against dismounted forces. Prior to August 2009, there were only a few such attacks per month. However, when the Marines entered the Helmand Valley, we saw a dramatic spike - from about 200 attacks per month to 480 within a single month.
The Costly Delay in Recognition and Response
What's particularly striking - and concerning - about this situation is the time it took us to recognize and respond to this change in battlefield dynamics. It wasn't until the fall of 2010, when I arrived in Afghanistan as the REF director, that we began to fully grasp the extent of the problem.
My conversations with brigade commanders on the ground were eye-opening. I remember speaking with Art Kandarian in Kandahar, who looked exhausted and overwhelmed. He told me, "I don't have enough time to think about how to solve my problem. I'm too busy trying to keep people alive from one day to the next."
Another commander, Jeff Martindale, showed me charts detailing IED attacks against his dismounted troops - information that hadn't yet percolated up to senior leadership.
The special operations task force commander I spoke with in Kabul articulated a clear need: "I’m losing operators in the last 100 meters to a target. I need something that fits in the back of a Chinook that can clear a path three feet wide and 100 meters long."
The System's Response
I was naive but it paid off. Before boarding my flight back to the U.S. I typed a short note to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army detailing my observations from the trip and highlighting the change in IED attacks. The note was not well received by the countless general officers responsible for equipping Soldiers in Afghanistan. By the time I landed in the U.S. two days later I had a dozen “invitations” to explain myself to a variety of organizations across DoD.
Before heading to the first meeting I had REF’s intel officer pull casualty reports for the past year from Afghanistan and highlight those reports that were the result of IED attacks against dismounted patrols. The data backed up my observations and with it in hand I began to educate organization leaders on the emerging problem. That data, the pictures I brought back and my personal insights changed the tone of our discussions from one of disbelief to one of immediate support.
Once we agreed the problem really was a significant problem, the entire force mobilized to find solutions. We delivered effective countermeasures within nine months. However, when we look at the timeline holistically, it took us 28 months from the initial change in battlefield dynamics to having scaled solutions on the ground.
While 28 months might seem fast compared to typical acquisition timelines, it was far too slow given the pace at which the Taliban were adapting. Our analysis showed that the Taliban were completing their observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop in just 8 months.
The Human Cost
The gap between our 28-month cycle and the Taliban's 8-month cycle had devastating consequences. During this period, we suffered nearly 5,000 casualties from IED attacks. This stark number underscores the human cost of our slow adaptation.
Lessons Learned
1. Anticipate Change: We need personnel on the battlefield whose primary role is to anticipate changes in enemy tactics and strategy. This role should go beyond merely responding to stated requirements. The forward teams from the U.S. Army REF and Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) were the best in the business at this.
2. Rapid Problem Definition: Once a change is identified, we must quickly define the problem in concrete terms that can guide solution development.
3. Ecosystem Approach: No single organization can solve complex battlefield challenges alone. We need to leverage a diverse ecosystem of problem solvers, from within the military and beyond.
4. Accelerate the OODA Loop: Our decision-making and implementation cycles must be dramatically shortened to keep pace with adaptive adversaries.
5. Value of Ground-Level Insights: Direct conversations with frontline commanders provided invaluable insights that weren't captured in official reports or requirements documents.
6. Flexible Funding and Acquisition: The ability to rapidly prototype, test, and scale solutions is crucial. Our partnership with the Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Agency allowed us to quickly move from small-scale tests to full deployment of effective solutions.
7. Cross-Pollination of Ideas: Lessons from one theater of operations (like Iraq) don't always translate directly to another (like Afghanistan). We need to be more nuanced in how we apply past experiences to new contexts.
8. Continuous Adaptation: The battlefield is constantly evolving. Our systems and processes need to be designed for continuous adaptation rather than periodic, large-scale changes.
9. Human Relationships Matter: My ability to have frank, honest conversations with commanders was largely due to pre-existing relationships. Building and maintaining these relationships across the force is crucial for rapid information flow and problem-solving.
10. Cost of Slow Adaptation: The human and strategic costs of slow adaptation in warfare are immense. We must internalize this lesson and build systems that can adapt as quickly as our adversaries.
Looking Forward
As we reflect on these experiences from Afghanistan, it's clear that the pace of adaptation in warfare is only accelerating. We're seeing this play out in real-time in conflicts like Ukraine, where the electronic warfare fight is evolving even faster than what we experienced.
The challenge before us is clear: how do we build military organizations and processes that can adapt as quickly as our adversaries? How do we shorten our OODA loop to match or exceed theirs?
These are not just academic questions. As our experiences in Afghanistan painfully demonstrated, lives depend on our ability to rapidly recognize changes in the battlefield environment, define problems clearly, and implement effective solutions quickly.
As we move forward, we must continue to evolve our approach to military innovation and adaptation. This means rethinking traditional structures and processes, embracing a more agile and decentralized approach to problem-solving, and fostering a culture that values anticipation and rapid response to change.
The lessons we've learned come at a great cost. It's our responsibility to ensure that these lessons inform and improve our future operations, saving lives and enhancing our effectiveness in the complex, rapidly changing environments of modern warfare.
